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This paper shows that about 70 percent of the variance of the yearly change
in the world private financial saving rate can be explained by lagged changes
in world stock and housing prices for the sample period 1982–2013. The
results suggest that increased fluctuations in asset prices since 1995 have led
to increased fluctuations in the world private financial saving rate. Wealth
effects on private demand appear to be large.
1 Introduction
The results in this paper suggest that changes in world asset prices have large
effects on changes in the world private financial saving rate. Annual data on the
world private financial saving rate, denoted sp∗t , are constructed for the 1980–2013
period. It will be seen that fluctuations in this rate are much larger after 1995 than
before. It is also the case that fluctuations in world stock and housing prices are
much larger after 1995 than before. Regression results show that about 70 percent
∗Cowles Foundation, Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8281.
Phone: 203-980-0646; e-mail: ray.fair@yale.edu; website: fairmodel.econ.yale.edu. I am in-
debted to William Brainard for helpful discussions.
of the variance of the change in sp∗t can be explained by lagged changes in world
stock and housing prices for the sample period 1982–2013.
sp∗t is constructed as follows. First, country i’s current account, Sit, is its
financial saving vis á vis the rest of the world. If its current account is in surplus,
there is an increase in its net foreign assets, and conversely if its current account is
in deficit. The sum of the current accounts of all countries in the world is zero after
converting the current accounts to a common currency. The financial saving of a
country’s government, SGit, is total government revenue minus total government
expense. If a government’s financial saving is positive, there is an increase in
the government’s net financial assets, and conversely if the government’s financial
saving is negative. The financial saving of a country’s private sector, SPit, is
Sit − SGit. Because the sum of Sit across all countries is zero after converting
to a common currency, the sum of SPit is equal to minus the sum of SGit after
converting each to a common currency. If the sum of SPit after converting to
a common currency is positive, this means there is a net flow of funds from the
world’s private sector to the world’s government sector, and conversely if the sum
is negative. sp∗t is the sum of SPit divided by world GDP, where all variables are
converted to U.S. dollars.
This paper is concerned with financial saving—flows of funds among sectors
and countries. Financial saving does not distinguish between consumption and
investment expenditures. The financial saving of a sector or country is total revenue
minus total expenditures, including expenditures that are classified in the national
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income and product accounts as investment expenditures.1 Consider the GDP
definition for a country, Yit = Cit + Iit + Git + EXit − IMit, where Yit is GDP,
Cit is consumption, Iit is investment, Git is government spending, EXit is the
level of exports, and IMit is the level of imports. Sit as used in this paper is
Yit − Cit − Iit − Git, namely the country’s current account, EXit − IMit. A
country’s saving, on the other hand, which will be denotedSAVit, is Yit−Cit−Git,
so Sit = SAVit − Iit. In this paper SAVit will be called “saving,” and Sit, SPit,
and SGit will be called “financial saving.”
Much of the literature on saving behavior is concerned with SAVit. It is im-
portant to realize that a country’s current account, Sit, can be large relative to its
GDP even though it has a low saving rate (because Iit is small). If one is talking
about which countries are financing, say, a large U.S. current account deficit, it is
not necessarily countries with high saving rates. By definition all current account
deficits are financed by current account surpluses (because the sum of Sit across
countries is zero), but this in itself says nothing about which countries have high
saving rates and which have low saving rates.
Bernanke (2005) in a well known speech discussed the possibility of a global
saving glut in the early 2000s, and econometric studies—for example, Chinn and
Ito (2007) and Gruber and Kamin (2007)—examining this theory followed. In the
econometric work current account balances for a number of countries are regressed
on a variety of variables. To the extent that the right hand side variables are
exogenous, these regressions can be considered reduced form regressions. An
1The difference between consumption and investment expenditures in national income and prod-
uct accounts is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. For example, consumer durable expenditures and
clothing expenditures have an investment component to them, as do educational expenditures.
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issue with this work is that there cannot be a global saving glut regarding current
account balances, since they sum to zero across countries. It is thus not clear
what to make of the regression results regarding a possible global saving glut.
Bernanke’s speech is in fact not really concerned with a global saving glut, but
with the large U.S. current account deficit. He discusses a number of possible
reasons for the large U.S. deficit and for the surpluses of some other countries.
None of this discussion requires the concept of a global saving glut.
Obstfeld (2010) focuses on current account deficits and surpluses leading up
to the world economic slowdown in 2008-2009—what he calls “current account
imbalances.” He discusses possible connections between the imbalances and the
U.S. financial crisis, and he argues that there is no simple cause and effect story.
This paper is not concerned with current account imbalances. Instead, the world
is divided into two sectors—private and government—and the financial saving of
the world’s private sector is examined, not the financial flows among countries.
There is an interesting literature showing that after taking into account capital
gains and losses on net foreign assets, the change in a country’s net foreign as-
sets can be quite different from the country’s current account—see, for example,
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Obstfeld (2010). The financial flow data used in
this paper do not include capital gains and losses, so these valuation issues are not
taken into account.
There is finally a literature explaining the private saving of various countries,
both across time and across countries—see, for example, Maason, Bayoumi, and
Samiei (1998) and Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000). This latter ref-
erence provides a good summary of previous work. In this literature the private
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saving rate is regressed on a number of variables, generally using panel data sets.
Again, if the right hand side variables are exogenous, these regressions can be
considered reduced form regressions. Government saving is usually one of the
right hand side variables, which seems problematic. If, say, there is a negative
shock to consumption, thus increasing private saving, this is likely to lead to a
fall in output and income, which will lead to a fall in tax revenue and possibly an
increase in some kinds of government spending. Government saving will thus fall.
Government saving is an endogenous variable, and it is not clear that it should be
on the right hand side of an equation explaining private saving. At any rate, this
is not an issue in this paper. Total private financial saving in the world is equal
to the negative of total government financial saving in the world, and the latter is
certainly not an exogenous variable explaining the former.
2 Data Collection
Except for the stock-price and housing-price data, all the data used in this paper
were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Only annual data
were used. The current account for each country in U.S. dollars, S$it, was taken
from the Balance of Payments section. When available, variable 129ba, balance
on current and capital account, was used. When this variable was not available,
the sum of variable 78ald (current account, n.i.e.) and variable 78bcd (capital
account, n.i.e.) was used. Variable 78bcd is minor and covers net transfers linked
to the acquisition of a fixed asset and the net disposal of nonproduced, nonfinancial
assets. The sum of 78ald and 78bcd is the balance on the financial account except
5
for net errors and omissions. All three variables. 129ba, 78ald, and 78bcd, are in
U.S. dollars.
Government financial saving, SGit, for each country was taken from the Gov-
ernment Finance section. When available, variable anob, net operating balance,
was used. If variable anob was not available but variable agob, gross operating
balance, was, agob was used. If neither variable anob nor agob was available,
variable ccsd, cash surplus/deficit, was used. If the country’s fiscal year were not
the same as the calendar year, the variable was converted by interpolation to the
calendar year under the assumption that the value in each quarter of a fiscal year is
one-fourth the value in that fiscal-year. SGit is in units of the country’s currency,
and it was converted to U.S. dollars by dividing by the exchange rate, eit: SG$it
= SGit/eit. eit is variable rf in the IFS data.
Nominal GDP for a country, Yit, was taken from the National Accounts section.
It was one of the following five variables: 99b.., 99b.c, 99b.d, 99bp., and 99bac.
Yit is in units of the country’s currency, and it was converted to U.S. dollars by
dividing by eit: Y $it = Yit/eit.
The private financial saving of a country in U.S. dollars is taken to be: SP$it =
S$it − SG$it. The country’s private financial saving rate is taken to be: spit =
SP$it/Y $it. The country’s government financial saving rate is taken to be: sgit =
SGit/Yit (= SG$it/Y $it).
The data are thus constructed from only a few IFS variables, at most five per
country. Data were collected for every country possible. Prior to 1980 there were
many missing observations, and 1980 was taken to be the first year considered.
The last year is 2013. In a few cases there were small gaps of a year or two in the
6
SGit data for a country, and in these cases values for SGit were constructed by in-
terpolating values of sgit and then computing values for SGit from the interpolated
values for sgit and the actual values for Yit. Also, in a few cases values for sgit at
the end of the period were extrapolated using the last available value for sgit and
then computing SGit from the extrapolated values for sgit and the actual values for
Yit. The same procedure was followed for missing values of S$it, although there
were very few of these. Finally, in a few cases values of Yit had to be interpolated
or extrapolated.
For the 1980-2013 period there are 38 countries for which observations on spit
are available for all years. These are listed in Table 1. For the 1990-2013 period
18 more countries are added, and for the 2000-2013 period 36 more countries are
added. These countries are also listed in Table 1. In each group the countries
are listed in the order they appear in the IFS data. What is of interest in this
paper is the sum of SP$it across all countries divided by the sum of Y $it, denoted
sp∗t . As a check on the data, it is informative to look at the sum of S$it across
all countries divided by the sum of Y $it, denoted s∗t . This ratio should be zero,
and it is of interest to see how far away from zero it is. sp∗t and s
∗
t are examined
in the next section. The world government financial saving rate, denoted sg∗t , is
s∗t − sp∗t . Since (as will be seen) s∗t is approximately zero, sg∗t is approximately
−sp∗t . Without measurement error it would be exactly−sp∗t . The discussion in this
paper focuses on sp∗t , but it obviously also pertains to sg
∗
t with the sign reversed.
Table 2 summarizes the data collection and the construction of the variables.
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Table 1
Countries in the Summation
IFS code Country
Group 1: 1980–2013
1 111 UNITED STATES












14 199 SOUTH AFRICA
15 223 BRAZIL
16 233 COLOMBIA
17 238 COSTA RICA







25 313 BAHAMAS, THE
26 443 KUWAIT
27 456 SAUDI ARABIA










38 924 CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND
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Table 1 (continued)







5 196 NEW ZEALAND

























8 311 ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
9 343 JAMAICA
10 369 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
11 469 EGYPT
12 474 YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF
13 513 BANGLADESH
14 522 CAMBODIA









24 917 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
25 921 MOLDOVA
26 922 RUSSIAN FEDERATION
27 926 UKRAINE











Construction of the Variables
Variable Construction
Data:
S$it IFS 129ba or 78ald + 78bcd
SGit IFS anob or agob or ccsd
eit IFS rf
Yit IFS 99b.. or 99b.c or 99b.d or 99bp. or 99bac
Individual Construction:
SG$it = SGit/ei
Y $it = Yit/eit
SP$it = S$it − SG$it
spit = SP$it/Y $it














t − sp∗t ≈ −sp∗t
N is the number of countries.
3 sp∗t and s∗t
Table 3 presents values of sp∗t and s
∗
t for three sets of countries. Observations
begin in 1980 for the first set (group 1), 1990 for the second set (groups 1 and
2), and 2000 for the third set (groups 1, 2, and 3). It is important to note that the
summation for the first set is always over only countries in that set—countries are
not added as observations become available for them. The values for sp∗t and s
∗
t
for, say, 1990 for the first set are thus different than those for the second set
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Table 3















1990 0.0257 0.0264 −0.0052 −0.0064
1991 0.0288 0.0294 −0.0047 −0.0057
1992 0.0342 0.0346 −0.0023 −0.0035
1993 0.0360 0.0363 0.0002 −0.0012
1994 0.0278 0.0285 −0.0014 −0.0020
1995 0.0262 0.0269 0.0002 −0.0003
1996 0.0215 0.0215 −0.0005 −0.0006
1997 0.0148 0.0141 0.0031 0.0024
1998 0.0069 0.0063 −0.0001 −0.0010
1999 −0.0028 −0.0028 −0.0056 −0.0055
2000 −0.0138 −0.0126 −0.0092 −0.0108 −0.0096 −0.0065
2001 0.0012 0.0026 0.0042 −0.0098 −0.0083 −0.0062
2002 0.0193 0.0199 0.0194 −0.0089 −0.0074 −0.0054
2003 0.0276 0.0276 0.0275 −0.0071 −0.0054 −0.0030
2004 0.0260 0.0250 0.0246 −0.0040 −0.0028 0.0000
2005 0.0166 0.0156 0.0163 −0.0061 −0.0052 −0.0009
2006 0.0057 0.0050 0.0046 −0.0045 −0.0038 0.0005
2007 0.0095 0.0081 0.0042 0.0007 0.0006 0.0019
2008 0.0262 0.0240 0.0180 −0.0007 −0.0016 0.0005
2009 0.0706 0.0666 0.0637 0.0033 0.0018 0.0030
2010 0.0670 0.0628 0.0599 0.0042 0.0024 0.0040
2011 0.0554 0.0522 0.0473 0.0029 0.0016 0.0032
2012 0.0515 0.0479 0.0437 0.0046 0.0023 0.0033
2013 0.0421 0.0401 0.0380 0.0061 0.0049 0.0052
Mean of absolute values 0.0040 0.0036 0.0031
1 = group 1 (38 countries)
2 = groups 1 and 2 (56 countries)
3 = groups 1, 2, and 3 (92 countries)
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because the summation is different. Remember that in principle s∗t should be zero
for each year.
As a check on the data, consider first in Table 3 how close the values of s∗t are to
zero. The values of s∗t range from−0.0108 for 2000 for set 1 to 0.0061 for 2013 for
set 1. The means of the absolute values for the three sets are 0.0040, 0.0036, and
0.0031, respectively. From the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October
2014 used here) one can get annual data on the world current account balance and
on world GDP (in U.S. dollars). For the 1980–2013 period the ratio of the world
current account balance to world GDP ranges from −0.0090 to 0.0055, and the
mean of the absolute values is 0.0041. This mean compares to the mean of 0.0040
for set 1 in Table 3. The values in Table 3 are thus of the same magnitude as the
IMF values, which suggests that most of the world that matters for this purpose is
being captured.
Figure 1 plots the three sets of values of sp∗t in Table 3. This figure is easy to
summarize. First, the values since 2000 have a similar pattern for the three sets,
and the values since 1990 have a similar pattern for the two sets. The results are
not sensitive to the addition of more countries. Second, the pattern is as follows: 1)
modest fluctuations around about 0.03 between 1980 and about 1995, 2) a large fall
between 1995 and 2000, 3) a large rise between 2000 and 2003, 4) a fall between
2003 and 2006, and 5) a large rise between 2006 and 2009, especially in 2009, and
5) a fall after 2009.
Another way of looking at, say, the large positive value of sp∗t in 2009 is that
governments were on average running large deficits. sp∗t for set 3 (all 92 countries)











1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Figure 1
World Private Financial Saving Rate (sp*)
1980-2013
group 1 ->
groups 1 and 2 ->





percent of world GDP . One might say there was a world-wide government deficit
problem in 2009, which is the same as saying there was a problem of a large
world-wide private financial saving rate.
4 World Asset Prices
A global stock price index from MSCI, denoted MSCIt, is available back to 1980.
Another global stock price index, from Standard & Poors, denoted SP1200t, is
available back to 1989. Observations on the last business day of each year were
collected for each of these two variables. Each of these variables was normalized
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by world trend GDP . Let Y $∗t denote the sum of Y $it over the group 1 countries.
log Y $∗t was regressed on a constant and time trend for the 1980–2013 period, and
the exponential of each predicted value from this regression, denoted ˆY $∗t , was
used for the trend value. Let
MSCIZt = MSCIt/ ˆY $∗t
SP1200Zt = SP1200t/ ˆY $∗t
These are the two global stock price indices used below. Values of SP1200Zt
are only available back to 1989, and this variable was spliced to MSCIZt for the
years 1980–1988. The spliced variable will be denoted SP1200ZQt.
For comparison purposes data on the Standard & Poors 500 U.S. stock price
index, denotedSP500t, were also collected, again observations for the last business
day of the year. It was normalized by U.S. trend GDP . log Y $USt was regressed
on a constant and time trend for the 1980–2013 period, and the exponential of each
predicted value from this regression, denoted ˆY $USt, was used for the U.S. trend
value. Let
SP500Zt = SP500t/ ˆY $USt
Observations on this variable are available for the entire 1980–2013 period.
Regarding world housing prices, one can get from the OECD Economic Out-
look Annex Table 60 values of housing price-to-rent ratios for 23 countries be-
ginning in 1998.2 An index of these ratios for the 23 countries was computed
2The 23 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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using as weights the country’s GDP in 2005 in dollars. This index will be denoted
WHOUSEt. Observations are only available for the 1998–2013 period.
A United States housing price index was also used, denoted USHOUSEt. It
is the ratio of the nominal market value of the stock of housing from the Flow of
Funds accounts to the real stock of housing from the National Income and Products
accounts, where the ratio is then deflated by a U.S. GDP deflator. The fourth quarter
of each year was used for these values. Observations are available for the entire
1980–2013 period.
It will be useful to examine plots of some of these variables. Figure 2 plots
MSCIZt and SP1200Zt for the common 1989–2013 period. It is obvious that
these two variables are highly correlated. They are essentially measuring the same
thing.
Figure 3 plots MSCIZt and SP500Zt for the 1980–2013 period. Remember
that SP500Zt is for the United States only. These two variables are highly cor-
related from 1997 on. From 1985 through 1996, MSCIZt is noticeably larger.
Stock markets were stronger outside of the United States during this period.
Figure 4 plots WHOUSEt and USHOUSEt for the common 1998–2013
period. The pattern of the two variables is similar, but WHOUSEt tends to lag
by a year. Also, the fall in housing prices in the last half of the 2000s is smaller
for WHOUSEt. But overall USHOUSEt and the one-year lagged value of
WHOUSEt are highly correlated. It is clear from the figure that the boom in
housing prices between the late 1990s and the mid 2000s is not just a United
States phenomenon. Nor is the fall in housing prices after that. A regression of
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Figure 3
MSCIZ and SP500Z: 1980-2013
MSCIZ (left scale) ->
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Figure 4
USHOUSE and WHOUSE: 1998-2013
USHOUSE (left scale) ->
<- WHOUSE (right scale)
yields an R2 of 0.862. For one of the regressions below, WHOUSEt was spiced to
USHOUSEt−1 from 1997 back. This spliced variable is denoted WHOUSEQt.
For the other regressions USHOUSEt−1 is used as the housing price variable. It
is taken as a proxy for world housing prices, which Figure 4 shows is a reasonable
approximation.
Figure 5 plots sp∗t and MSCIZt lagged one year, i.e., MSCIZt−1. The neg-
ative correlation is remarkable. The figure indicates why the regression results
below are so strong. Finally, Figure 6 plots sp∗t and USHOUSEt lagged one year.
Comparing Figures 5 and 6, the large increases in housing prices did not begin
until the late 1990s, whereas the large increases in stock prices began in the mid
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Figure 5
sp* and MSCIZ lagged once: 1981-2013
sp* (left scale) ->
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Figure 6
sp* and USHOUSE lagged once: 1981-2013
sp* (left scale) ->
USHOUSE lagged once (right scale) ->
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5 Wealth Effects on sp∗t
In Table 4 the change in sp∗t is regressed on one-year lagged changes in asset
prices. How should these regressions be interpreted? Consider sp∗t as an en-
dogenous variable in a large world simultaneous equations structural model, with
many endogenous, lagged endogenous, and exogenous variables, where some of
the explanatory variables are lagged asset prices. Now solve for the reduced form
equation for sp∗t , where sp
∗
t is then a function of lagged endogenous variables and
exogenous variables. Take the first difference of this equation, where the change
in sp∗t is then a function of the changes in lagged endogenous variables and ex-
ogenous variables. If lagged asset prices are explanatory variables in the overall
model, then the changes in lagged asset prices will be in the reduced form equation.
Let ∆At−1 denote the change in some lagged asset price. If ∆At−1 is uncorrelated
with all the variables in the reduced form equation, an OLS regression of ∆sp∗t
on a constant and ∆At−1 will result in a consistent estimate of the coefficient of
∆At−1.3
How good is the assumption that ∆At−1 is uncorrelated with all the variables
in the reduced form equation, where A is a world stock price index or a housing
price index? The assumption is valid if the change in A is simply a random walk
with drift, which is supported by much of the finance literature. Results reported in
footnote 11 in Fair (2014) are consistent with this assumption, where no significant
effects could be found of various lagged macroeconomic variables on the changes
3This is assuming linearity. For a nonlinear structural model, it may not be possible to solve for





∆sp∗t is the left-hand-side variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant 0.00085 0.00096 0.00125 0.00114 0.00116
(0.73) (0.87) (1.08) (0.88) (0.66)
∆MSCIZt−1 −0.00128
(−5.97)




∆USHOUSEt−1 −0.03955 −0.03825 −0.04399 −0.03845





SE 0.00656 0.00621 0.00648 0.00702 0.00632
R2 0.692 0.724 0.699 0.647 0.724
DW 1.66 1.55 1.84 1.54 1.54
Estimation period: 1982–2013, 32 observations.
OLS estimates.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Range of sp∗t is −0.0138 to 0.0706.
in U.S. stock and housing prices. The results in Table 4 will thus be interpreted as
roducing consistent coefficient estimates, subject to the nonlinear issue discussed
in the previous footnote.
Equations (1), (2), and (3) in Table 4 use the U.S. housing price variable,
USHOUSE. Each has a different stock price variable: MSCIZ, SP1200ZQ,
and SP500Z, respectively, where SP1200ZQ is SP1200Z spliced from 1988
back using MSCIZ. The R2’s are remarkably high—0.692, 0.724, and 0.699
respectively, consistent with the plots in Figures 5 and 6. The largest R2 is for
SP1200ZQ, but they are all very close. Remember that SP500Z is for the United
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States only. Given the high correlation between SP500Z and world stock prices,
especially since 1997, using SP500Z in place of the world indices yields roughly
the same results. The U.S. house price variable has a consistent coefficient estimate
in all three regressions, and its coefficient estimate is little affected by which stock
price variable is used.
Equation (4) is equation (2) with the spliced version of the world housing
price variable replacing the U.S. housing price variable. Remember that the world
variable tends to lag the U.S. variable by a year, and it was spliced from 1997
back using the U.S. variable lagged one year. It is thus entered with a subscript
t in Table 4, although it is in effect lagged a year. The world variable does not
work as well as the U.S. variable. The R2 has dropped from 0.724 to 0.647. One
interpretation of this result is that the U.S. variable is a better measure of world
housing prices than is the world variable derived from the OECD price-to-rent
ratios.
Equation (5) is equation (2) with the lagged percentage change in world GDP
added, denoted %∆WORLDYt−1, added. This variable is not significant and adds
nothing to the explanatory power of the equation. It is not a good proxy for the
other explanatory variables in the reduced form equation.
6 Implications
Given from Table 4 that about 70 percent of the variance of the change in the world
private financial saving rate can be explained by the change in lagged asset prices,
lagged values of wealth are likely to be important explanatory variables in aggregate
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consumption and investment equations in structural macroeconometric models,
where wealth includes equity and houses. This is true for the U.S. equations in the
mutlicountry econometric model used in Fair (2014).
The huge increase in sp∗t in 2009 is an informative example of what the regres-
sion results are picking up. Consider Figures 5 and 6. In 2008 (remember that the
asset prices are lagged once in the figures) both stock prices and housing prices
fell dramatically. This is contrary to a number of other years in which they moved
in opposite directions. The regression results are picking up the fact that these two
falls preceded the huge increase in sp∗t in 2009—an increase larger than any of the
other increases in the sample period.
A theory consistent with the results in Table 4 is that world asset-price changes
like stock-price changes affect world consumption through wealth effects and af-
fect world investment through cost of capital effects. The simple life cycle model,
for example, says that an unanticipated increase in wealth leads, other things being
equal, to an increase in consumption. According to this theory, the large fluctua-
tions in sp∗t since 1995 are driven in part by the large fluctuations in world asset
prices during this period. This theory relies on asset-price changes being exoge-
nous to the households’ and firms’ decision making processes: asset prices change
for some reason independent of these processes, and after the asset-price changes,
households and firms respond.
Another possible theory is one in which there is an exogenous change in house-
holds’ and firms’ expectations of some future variable, like future productivity, and
this leads them to both bid asset prices up or down and to change consumption and
investment. If productivity is expected to be higher in the future than originally
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thought, this would lead households to bid asset prices up and increase consump-
tion at the same time. Lantz and Sarte (2001) have a general equilibrium model
in which this effect is at work. In this theory asset-price changes do not cause
consumption and investment changes, since all three are determined by changes
in expectations. In this case it does not make sense, for example, to talk about the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.
There are, of course, other variables in the reduced form equation for sp∗t . These
are likely to include current exogenous fiscal-policy variables and various lagged
endogenous variables. If, for example, the monetary policy rule for a country has
the lagged value of the country’s unemployment rate as an explanatory variable,
the lagged value of the unemployment rate will be in the reduced form equation
for sp∗t . This being said, the best explanation of sp
∗
t is likely to come not from
estimating a reduced form equation but from estimating a multicountry structural
model and then solving for sp∗t . What is dramatic about the results in Table 4 is that
so much of the variance of ∆sp∗t can be explained by simply the lagged changes
in stock prices and housing prices.
If asset-price changes (or forces like changes in productivity expectations that
drive asset-price changes) are essentially unpredictable, then the present results
suggest that much of the change in sp∗t is unpredictable. In a complete structural
model some of the change in sp∗t would be predictable because it would depend on
various exogenous and lagged endogenous variables, including various exogenous
fiscal-policy variables. The main message here is that so much of the change in
sp∗t seems to be driven by (unpredictable) changes in asset prices.
If the forces behind asset-price changes are largely unpredictable, this does not
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necessarily mean that policy makers have no ability to affect these changes. Take
the huge boom in U.S. stock prices between 1995 and 2000. Many people thought
at the time that this boom was a stock market bubble, but this did not appear
to be the Fed’s view. Alan Greenspan talked about a new age of productivity,
and the Fed lowered interest rates during certain bad times in the stock market.4
The view among many was that there was a “Greenspan put” regarding stock
prices. It is possible that the Fed could have curtailed this boom by raising (or
not lowering) interest rates and margin requirements. Policy actions like these are
themselves unpredictable, and thus changes in stock prices and housing prices can
be unpredictable even though they are influenced by (unpredictable) policy actions.
Another example is the lack of much regulation of the U.S. housing market
during the boom in housing prices between the late 1990s and 2006. Had there
been more regulation, housing prices may not have risen as much as they did. The
bailout of financial institutions during the 2008–2009 recession is also a policy
action that may affect stock prices.
Therefore, to the extent that the large fluctuations in sp∗ since 1995 are unde-
sirable, policy actions or lack thereof may bear part of the blame.
4Perhaps the most dramatic Fed action in this period was the surprise lowering of the federal
funds rate on October 15, 1998. The U.S. stock market was down from its highs in late September,
and the Fed cited unsettled conditions in financial markets as one of the reasons for the decrease.
This resulted in a huge increase in stock prices after the announcement.
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7 Conclusion
Since the world government financial saving rate, sg∗t , is −sp∗t aside from mea-
surement error, the above discussion about sp∗t also pertains to sg
∗
t with the sign
reversed. Under the first theory an increase in world asset prices stimulates con-
sumption and investment and leads to a fall in sp∗t and thus a rise in sg
∗
t . The main
reason for the rise in sg∗t is the increase in taxes due to the more expansive world
economy. Under this theory the behavioral changes caused by the increase in asset
prices are increases in private consumption and investment. Governments play a
passive role. sg∗t changes because taxes change. It could be that an increase in
asset prices leads to a decrease in discretionary government spending and/or an
increase in discretionary tax rates, but this is probably quantitatively small. The
driving force behind the large government deficits in the world in 2009 is likely the
huge fall in world equity and housing prices that led to large decreases in private
consumption and investment. Under the second theory the driving force is a change
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